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This paper examines the effects of unemployment insurance on escape rates from 
unemployment using data from the 1998 Displaced Worker Survey. Transitions from 
unemployment to employment are modeled using a flexible representation of the baseline 
hazard function and allowing for discrete changes through time in the effects of 
unemployment insurance benefits, as well as those of the other covariates. The impact of 
unemployment insurance is also modeled using a time-varying benefits measure, namely, 
time to exhaustion of benefits. Potential biases stemming from reverse causation and 
unobserved individual heterogeneity are accommodated. Both approaches render 
transparent the major disincentive effects of access to benefits on re-employment rates 
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I.  Introduction 
In the conventional search model, unemployment insurance elevates the reservation wage 
and lengthens the duration of the unemployment spell.  Once we allow for finite benefits, 
reservation wages should fall with the approach of benefit exhaustion. As a result of the 
decline in the value of remaining unemployed, and increased search intensity, escape 
rates should rise monotonically (Mortensen, 1977). (Indeed, even if workers are not 
engaged in productive search – as in the static labor-leisure model – a clustering of 
observations around the exhaustion point is predicted.) After benefit exhaustion, a cet. 
par. constant hazard rate is indicated.
1  
       Despite the insights of search theory, only a handful of studies have allowed for a 
time-varying effect of benefits on unemployment duration. The classic study is by Meyer 
(1990), who deploys time-to-exhaustion splines in analyzing administrative data for U.S. 
males from twelve states, 1978-83 (see also Katz and Meyer, 1990).
2 Meyer reports that 
the probability of escaping from unemployment rises dramatically shortly before 
exhaustion: from 6 to 2 weeks before exhaustion the hazard increases 67 percent, and one 
week away from exhaustion the hazard increases by an additional 97 percent (though the 
hazard is flat between 41 to 6 weeks). Other U.S. studies have examined the time-varying 
effect of benefits in terms of a competing risks model where the choice is that between 
full- and part-time work (McCall, 1996, 1997) and indirectly via tests of the 
proportionality assumption (McCall, 1994). Another has  examined the time-varying 
effects of a reemployment bonus (and recall expectations) on joblessness (Anderson, 
1992). Although there is some dispute about whether or not benefit exhaustion is the 
source of observed spikes in escape rates at 26 (or 39) weeks, constraining benefits to   2
have the same effects on the hazard function at each point in the unemployment spell is 
clearly contraindicated in the data.
3 
       There is almost no modern British evidence, but in an analysis U.K. Department of 
Health and Social Security data for 1978/79, Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) report 
more muted effects of unemployment  income, comprising earnings and need 
supplemented unemployment benefits, on unemployment duration. Specifically, their 
basic specification indicates that income while unemployed does not have an effect on 
joblessness beyond the twelfth week of unemployment, rising to twenty weeks with 
allowance for unobserved individual heterogeneity. These intervals are well below the 
12-month national insurance benefit then payable.  
       In the present treatment, we use very recent U.S. data on displaced workers that has a 
number of distinct advantages over the earlier literature. Thus, in contrast to 
administrative data it contains information on both recipient and nonrecipients of 
unemployment insurance benefits. The disadvantages of the data used by Meyer (1990) 
and others are that they refer to recipients alone and are moreover only observed while 
benefits are paid, at which point they are censored. And unlike earlier U.S. displaced 
worker data the reported jobless duration is not contaminated by multiple spells of 
unemployment and there is no top coding of joblessness.  
       We shall employ a flexible representation for the baseline hazard function and allow 
the effect of unemployment benefits to vary before, at, and after exhaustion of benefits 
(either 26 or 30 weeks) – and, in a new departure, we shall allow the effects of the other 
covariates to vary over the jobless spell. In a final specification, we replace the 
unemployment benefits variables with a time-to-exhaustion measure while allowing for a   3
potential spike at the point of exhaustion. Throughout, care is taken to avoid the problem 
of  reverse causation, while accounting for omitted heterogeneity.  
       The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II introduces the flexible representation 
of the baseline hazard and the manner of the incorporation of time-varying effects. 
Section III reviews the data and indicates how we dealt with the problem of reverse 
causation. Section IV details the empirical findings. A brief summary concludes. 
 
II.  Model Specification 
Consider a time axis that is divided into M intervals by points k1, k2,..., km-1.  Assuming a 
conventional piecewise-constant proportional hazards function, we can write  
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where x is a vector of explanatory variables for worker i,  β  identifies the regression 
coefficients, and λ m is the exponential parameter for the m interval (Prentice and 
Gloeckler, 1978; Lancaster 1990).  
  We will first consider the specification of the impact of unemployment benefits 
on the hazard rate. As discussed earlier, we want to identify the role of unemployment 
insurance benefits (UB) before, at, and after the point of exhaustion. For this purpose, we 
expand the hazard model as follows   
{
[] [ ] [ ] }, ) ( ) ( ) 4 (








t t I UB t t I UB t t I UB
UB x t h
i i i
m i i




                  (2) 
where  I denotes the indicator function and t* is the maximum potential duration of 
unemployment benefits. Proceeding in this way, the  1 α  parameter gives the impact of   4
unemployment benefits prior to exhaustion,  2 α  denotes their effect at the point of 
exhaustion, while  3 α  picks up any post-exhaustion influence. In order to avoid 
misrepresenting the effect of benefits, we must not allow short durations (of less than 4 
weeks) to influence the estimation of parameter 1 α . Apart from the existence of waiting 
periods (of typically one week), it is well known that workers with very short durations of 
unemployment have lower take-up rates. 
              Alternatively, we can also allow for increasing hazard rates as the expiration of 
benefits approaches 




1 i t t I UB t t I t t t I UB UB x t h i i m i i = + < − > + + δ δ λ β   (3)    
              Moreover, because it is possible that the time-varying effects of unemployment 
benefits may capture time-varying effects of other covariates, in both approaches we will 
also need to allow for time-varying coefficients in respect of these regressors as well. To 
this end, it seems reasonable to set breakpoints alternatively at 4 and 26 weeks. Taking 
our first specification, for example, we re-specify the hazard function as 
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and proceed similarly for a cutoff at 26 weeks. Here the  1 β  coefficient vector provides 
the impact of the regressors during the first time period and the  2 β  vector gives the 
change in the impact of the regressors in the second period. 
  Turning to the issue of implementation, we will employ a piecewise-constant 
specification, with jobless durations grouped into 16 intervals. (As noted below, our 
unemployment measure is weekly spell length, which is no longer top coded.) The choice   5
of 16 intervals is partially dictated by the relative frequency of the observations within 
each (weekly) cell. Specifically, the intervals are weekly observations up to and including 
week 4, followed by 11 intervals of 4 weeks up to and including week 48, and with the 
balance of the observations constituting the final interval. 
  In order to estimate the model, the survivor function has first to be defined. For 
the m interval this can be can expressed as 
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where ) ( m k Λ  is the integrated hazard function. 
We can incorporate unobserved individual heterogeneity through the inclusion of 
a multiplicative error term v in the hazard function. For present purposes, we will select a 
conventional parametric form for v, namely, the gamma distribution with unit mean and 
variance 
2 σ . This choice allows us use a simple closed form for the survival function 
(Lancaster, 1990) 
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The likelihood contribution for an individual who exits at interval m is given by S(km) - 
S(km-1) and for an individual whose duration is censored at m by S(km-1). 
In general, the likelihood function can be expressed  
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where δ i identifies an uncensored duration and δ mi equals 1 if the individual’s duration 
falls in the m interval, 0 otherwise.
4 
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III.  Data 
The data used in this inquiry are taken from the nationally representative, three-year 
retrospective Displaced Worker Supplement to the February 1998 Current Population 
Survey. The dataset – and changes in the survey including the wording of the core 
displacement question and the recall period over which information on job loss is 
recorded – are well described elsewhere (see, for example, Kletzer, 1998; Farber, 2003), 
so that only brief introductory remarks are required here. The DWS has been conducted 
biennially since 1984. It contains information on the nature of the lost job and subsequent 
joblessness for workers displaced by reason of plant closure, slack work, or abolition of 
shift or position. Such data can be supplemented by extensive information on the personal 
characteristics of the worker contained in the parent CPS.   
  The DWS has a number of advantages over administrative data. The principal 
deficiency of administrative data is that there is no counterfactual, with the result that it is 
difficult to tell whether rising hazards observed at or around the point of benefit 
exhaustion truly reflect the impact of impending or actual benefit exhaustion. As we have 
noted in passing, earlier work using the DWS indicates that the escape rates of not just 
recipients but also nonrecipients are characterized by humps at 26 and 39 weeks, the later 
representing the end of ‘extended’ benefits (Fallick, 1991, p. 230). Added to which, there 
is also the problem that all duration observations using administrative data are censored 
at benefit expiration. In sharp contrast, the DWS data allow us to observe what happens 
before, at, and after the exhaustion of benefits.  
  There are inevitably some shortcomings of the DWS data. Thus, retrospective 
data are subject to recall bias – individuals experiencing displacement in past years may   7
be more likely to understate their jobless duration than are more recent job losers – and   
respondents are prone to round (to months and quarters) their reported spells of 
unemployment. Beginning with the 1994 survey, however, the period over which job loss 
is measured has been reduced from five to three years, which should reduce the recall 
bias problem. Also, our use of a flexible, piecewise constant representation of the 
baseline hazard function should serve to accommodate the rounding problem.  
  If the former two problems are fairly easily dealt with, a third is potentially more 
difficult. The DWS data merely identify whether the respondent is a recipient or 
nonrecipient of unemployment benefits. An unknown number of those classified as 
‘nonrecipients’ may in fact have been eligible for benefits but failed to collect them 
because they expected to find employment within an interval corresponding to the 
waiting times and filing delays associated with drawing benefits. In other words, receipt 
of benefits is not the same as eligibility for benefits and may depend on the duration of a 
spell. (Note that administrative data are subject to the selfsame problem.) Treating 
nonrecipients as noneligibles may be expected to upwardly bias the effect of 
unemployment benefits on joblessness. This problem of reverse causation is handled by 
making our estimation procedure ‘blind,’ that is, we do not consider the effect of 
unemployment benefits during the first four weeks of the unemployment event but 
continue to use the duration data. This procedure is better than the alternative of simply 
truncating the data at four weeks, albeit with appropriate accommodation for sample 
truncation.
5   
Use of the 1998 DWS has some advantages over its precursors. The definition of 
unemployment in the first two DWS surveys admits of multiple spells of joblessness.   8
Since the 1988 survey the measure of unemployment refers to the length of the single 
spell of joblessness that followed the displacement event and resulted in reemployment. 
To be sure, the definition still does not require the unemployed individual to be engaged 
in active search so that this single spell may include intervals of suspended job 
search/withdrawal but it no longer includes multiple spells of joblessness. A more recent 
innovation is that the DWS unemployment data are no longer top coded (at 99 weeks of 
joblessness). The only source of right censoring in our data stem from our inclusion (via 
the CPS) of those individuals who failed to find work after displacement but who were 
nevertheless economically active as of the survey date. Such censoring is explicitly 
accommodated in the likelihood function given in equation (7). 
  Two pieces of information were derived from other sources. First, data on 
maximum benefit entitlement was compiled from the Green Book Overview of 
Entitlement Programs, published annually by the Committee of Ways and Means of the 
U.S. House of Representatives. These data were used to construct our BEFORE, AT, and 
AFTER phases of benefit receipt and the time-varying regressor TIMEX, or time to 
exhaustion of benefits, which is measured as maximum benefit entitlement less elapsed 
duration of unemployment. As a practical matter, it emerged that only two states had 
maximum durations greater than 26 weeks over the sample period. These were 
Massachusetts and Washington, each with a maximum entitlement of 30 weeks. Second, 
the DWS data were supplemented with BLS data on (average annual) state 
unemployment rates at the year of displacement. 
Although we included those who wanted but never found employment after losing 
their jobs – as well as those individuals who transitioned directly into reemployment   9
without any intervening spell of joblessness – we excluded individuals who were not 
economically active at the time of the survey. Further, because the nature of displacement 
is not well defined for certain individuals and sectors, those employed part time and in 
agriculture at the point of displacement were also excluded, as were those aged less than 
20 years and above 61 years as of February 1998. These restrictions yielded a sample of 
2,762 individuals. Descriptive information on the sample is provided in the appendix 
table. 
(Figure 1 near here) 
   Finally, to set the scene for our cet. par. analysis, Figure 1 charts the differences 
in the empirical (Life-Table) hazard rates of unemployment benefit nonrecipients and 
recipients. As can be seen, the escape rates of nonrecipients remain considerably higher 
than those of recipients even after the first four weeks of the jobless spell. For these 
initial weeks it is likely that the line of causation does indeed run from duration to 
unemployment benefit status. At week 26, however the escape rates of recipients pick up 
and well exceed those of nonrecipients. And thereafter, as the polynomial curve fitted to 
the empirical hazard makes clearer, the escape rates of recipients seemingly continue to 
exceed those of nonrecipients.  
   
IV.  Findings 
Results of fitting the piecewise constant hazards model allowing for time-varying effects 
of unemployment benefits are given in Table 1. It will be recalled that the effects of 
benefits are calculated before (comprising an interval from the fifth week of joblessness 
to week 25 or 29 according to the individual’s state), at (week 26 or 30), and after (week 
27 or 31 onward) their expiration. The unemployment benefits variable and other   10
regressors capture factors that influence the reservation wage and/or the arrival rate of job 
offers. In the first column of table the effects of the other regressors are constrained not to 
vary through time. The remaining columns allow for a distinct break in the effects of the 
latter at 4 weeks and 26 weeks, respectively.  
(Table 1 near here) 
Beginning with the most parsimonious specification, it can be seen that, prior to 
benefit exhaustion, the escape rates of recipients are 37.8 percent lower than those of 
recipients. At expiration, however, the hazard rate of former recipients is now more than 
twice that of nonrecipents (2.54 times to be precise), and it remains around 27 percent 
higher over the balance of the employment event, although the after-exhaustion point 
estimate is less well determined.  
As far as the other regressors are concerned, the worker’s age (AGE) and tenure 
(TENURE) with the firm at the point of displacement are associated with significantly 
lower escape rates from joblessness. (The statistical insignificance of the negative 
coefficient on measure of labor market slack – the displacement-contemporaneous state 
unemployment rate (UR) – is commented on below.)  The effect of the tenure variable 
most probably captures the elevated reservation wages of long-serving workers, while the 
two other arguments proxy the reduced arrival rate of job offers with age and higher labor 
market slack. In contrast, years of education (SCHOOLING), race (WHITE) and marriage 
in the case of males (MARRIED) are each associated with more rapid job finding after 
displacement. More educated workers might be expected to have higher escape rates 
because of their greater search efficiency, higher opportunity cost of staying unemployed, 
and generally better job prospects. Similarly, the result for race is familiar and captures   11
the poorer opportunities facing blacks as a result of both objective and discriminatory 
factors. The result for married males presumably picks up a household head effect, and 
thus likely reflects the higher opportunity cost of unemployment for married males and 
their greater search intensity. Note there is virtually no effect of marriage on female 
escape rates, while single males have marginally lower escape rates than the omitted 
category of single females.  
But although the effects of formal advance notice of impending displacement 
(NOTICE) – defined as written notice of at least two months – and job loss by reason of 
plant closure (CLOSE) are also positive they are not statistically significant. It is often 
argued in the displacement literature that the compositional or labor quality implications 
of plant closings – all workers are ‘canned’ when a plant closes its doors rather than a 
subset of workers (selected by management) in the case of slack work or abolition of shift 
or position – and the enhanced search facilitated by advance notice should each lead to 
lower joblessness. Yet, as we have seen, neither effect is well determined. The same is 
true of union membership (UNION) which might also connote possession of an 
informational edge in the labor market. With one exception, the inclusion of state 
dummies, introduced in order to accommodate state differences in unemployment 
insurance rules (other than maximum potential duration of benefits), does not affect the 
precision of the regression coefficient estimates and in particular the measured impact of 
unemployment benefits. That one exception is the state unemployment rate in the year of 
displacement (UR), which is no longer statistically significant. 
  The information in the next three columns of Table 1 is for a specification that 
allows for a discrete change in the effect of the non-UB covariates at four weeks.   12
Although taken from a single equation, the presentation of ‘separate’ columns for 
joblessness of ≤ 4  weeks and > 4 weeks in respect of  these other regressors helps 
identify shifts in effect. Beginning with the effects of benefit recipiency, however, we 
obtain virtually identical coefficient estimates for each of the three phases – before, at, 
and after exhaustion of benefits, respectively – as in the first column of the table. In each 
case, however, the coefficient estimates are slightly better determined than before. 
Overall, the likelihood ratio statistic is 16.6, below the critical value of the chi-square 
distribution with 11 degrees of freedom of 19.68 (for a 5 percent level of significance). 
As far as the other variables are concerned, it can be seen that statistically 
significant changes in the coefficient estimates (after 4 weeks) are confined to just three 
arguments: NOTICE, AGE, and TENURE. In the case of the first variable, it appears that 
the impact of lengthy written notice is confined to the first few weeks of joblessness: the 
change in the coefficient estimate after 4 weeks is both opposite in sign and larger in 
absolute magnitude than the value prior to that. (Recall that the coefficients are additive.) 
As for older workers, there is some indication that the (deleterious) impact of AGE is also 
short-lived, at least in part. On the other hand, the effects of tenure in reducing escape 
rates seem to grow with time.    
Use of a different, 26-week breakpoint, shown in the last three columns of Table 
1, produces few surprises. Thus, the results for the three phases of unemployment 
benefits are not materially affected, and there are just two statistically significant changes 
in the case of the other covariates. For both SCHOOLING and AGE there is every 
indication that the positive effects of the former and the negative effects of the latter do 
not continue beyond the twenty-sixth week of joblessness. That is to say, in each case, the   13
opposing effects are a wash. Finally, we note that the likelihood ratio statistic is now even 
lower than before, at 9.86.  
         (Table 2 near here) 
In Table 2 we substitute a time-varying unemployment benefit regressor for the 
discrete measure, although we still allow for a spike in escape rates at exhaustion of 
benefits. It will be recalled that our time to exhaustion of benefits measure, TIMEX, 
represents the difference between an individual’s elapsed duration of unemployment and 
the maximum duration of benefits in his or her state. It is anticipated that its coefficient 
estimate will be negative, meaning that the escape rates of recipients will fall further 
below those of recipients the greater the interval to benefit exhaustion, or equivalently 
that the disparity between the two groups will steadily narrow with the progression of the 
jobless spell.
6  
As before, the first column of the table provides results for the most parsimonious 
specification. It can be seen that one week away from benefit exhaustion the escape rates 
of recipients are just 3.3 percent below those of nonrecipients. But 10 weeks before 
exhaustion the escape rates of recipients are only two-thirds those of recipients difference 
and at 20 weeks just one-third of those of recipients. Note that the coefficient estimate for 
TIMEX is highly statistically significant. Also note that at exhaustion the escape rate of 
recipients spikes upward, such that it is now more than twice that of their nonrecipient 
counterparts; specifically, it is 2.43 times that of nonrecipients, almost the same as the 
corresponding estimate from the first column of Table 1. 
Not surprisingly, the point estimates of the other regressors in the first column of 
Table 2 are almost identical to those reported in Table 1. Equally, there are no surprises   14
when we allow for the discrete changes in the effects of the other regressors at 4 and 26 
weeks. In other words, the balance of Table 2 confirms the absence of persistence in the 
advantages of greater education and longer notice and in the disadvantages of age.  
But the main result is that use of a time-varying unemployment benefits regressor 
usefully complements our earlier analysis of the time-varying effects of unemployment 
insurance in suggesting that potential benefit duration has significant behavioral effects 
on worker job finding . 
Finally, we should note that the variance parameter of the gamma distribution 
converged toward zero in all specifications. We interpret this outcome to mean that 
unobserved individual heterogeneity is not a serious cause for concern in the present 
exercise, given the flexibility of the baseline hazard function and the set of regressors 
employed. This interpretation is further reinforced by the fact that in almost all cases this 
eventuated only after inclusion of the state dummies. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
Our analysis has demonstrated that the effects of unemployment insurance on jobless 
duration in the wake of job displacement are real and not an artifact of the data resulting 
from either heaping (i.e. respondent rounding) or unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
Receipt of unemployment benefits is associated with a marked reduction in escape rates 
prior to their exhaustion. Thus, the escape rates of recipients over this interval are roughly 
40 percent lower than those of their nonrecipients counterparts. Note that this estimate is 
unlikely to contaminated by a reverse line of causation running from duration to benefit 
receipt precisely because we did not allow benefits to have any effect during the first 
month of unemployment experience. At or around benefit exhaustion, the escape rates of   15
recipients are more than twice those of nonrecipients, even if comparatively few spells 
last long enough to be affected by the spike. (After exhaustion, the escape rates of former 
recipients continue to be greater than those of nonrecipients but the benefit effect is less 
precisely estimated.) Our major finding is reinforced when we substitute potential benefit 
duration for unemployment benefit status. That is, we observe a steady reduction – of 3.3 
percent a week – in the relative escape rates of recipients the further away is benefit 
exhaustion. Since we are controlling for both unobserved heterogeneity and state fixed 
effects, we are confident that we are uncovering behavioral effects. This result is 
underscored by the finding from other work using the DWS that longer search does not 
lead to a material improvement in postdisplacement wages (e.g. Addison and Blackburn, 
2000). 
       Our broad findings are very much in line with results from other studies in a very 
sparse literature. But, to repeat, the advantages if the present study are fourfold. First, 
unlike analyses using administrative data, we have the counterfactual of nonrecipients 
behavior while our data on recipient duration are not censored when benefits run out. 
Second, unlike work using information on displaced individuals, our data reflect material 
improvements in the DWS through time, such as duration data that are no longer right 
censored or that include multiple spells of joblessness. Third, unlike studies based on 
both types of information, we examine both males and females and find among other 
things that marriage does not greatly affect the behavior of females. Finally, our model 
allows for and reports evidence favoring time-varying effects of non-UI regressors. 
       Policy is as ever a more difficult consideration. We would resist the interpretation 
that our findings support a reduction in the periodicity of benefits. This strategy is likely   16
more appropriate for European countries than the United States. By the same token, they 
arguably do point to initiatives that stimulate more rapid job finding on the part of the 
great mass of the insured unemployed population. Obvious measures here include job 
search assistance allied to more stringent application of the job search test and further 
experimentation with reemployment bonuses. 
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Endnotes 
1. However, Meyer (1990, p. 758) notes that this constant post-exhaustion hazard rate 
may lie above or below the exhaustion hazard according to whether leisure and income 
are complements or substitutes, repectively. 
2. The earliest study is Nickell’s (1979) analysis of 426 males drawn from the British 
1972 General Household Survey. He allows the effect of the unemployment insurance 
(UI) replacement rate on escape rates to change with spell duration, and is able to reject 
the null of a constant effect of the UI measure on the hazard. 
3. In particular, Fallick (1991) has argued that such spikes characterize the hazard rates of 
recipients and nonrecipients alike.  Using data from the January 1984 Displaced Worker 
Survey, he reports that shortly before and shortly after benefits commonly expire the cet. 
par. effect of unemployment insurance is statistically insignificant. He speculates that the 
spikes are a function of rounding on the part of both insured and uninsured respondents 
(on which, see Poterba and Summers, 1984; Sider, 1984). Note that Fallick reports time 
varying effects of UI on escape rates for those displaced workers who change industry.   
 4. As a robustness check, we also employed a Cox partial likelihood estimator. The 
advantage of this approach is of course that it can equally well accommodate time-
varying effects of the covariates without the need to specify a parametric form for the 
baseline hazard. In the event, the estimation results were remarkably similar to the ones 
presented below for the piecewise-constant estimator.  
5. Using an eight-week knot points did not appreciably alter our results: the reduction in 
the hazard was still large and statistically significant, albeit a bit smaller in absolute 
magnitude.  
6. This specification does not allow for differences between benefit recipients and 
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<=4 weeks >4 weeks <=26 weeks >26 weeks
Variable
UB
    'BEFORE' -0,475
(0.064)
    'AT' 1,265
(0.231)
    'AFTER' 0,242
(0.141)
SCHOOLING 0,038 0,031 0,009 0,042 -0,054
(0.009) (0.012) (0.018) (0.009) (0.027)
AGE -0,012 -0,017 0,009 -0,014 0,017
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007)
TENURE -0,013 -0,005 -0,017 -0,012 -0,006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011)
WHITE 0,241 0,250 0,030 0,237 0,184
(0.065) (0.088) (0.128) (0.069) (0.209)
MALE -0,109 -0,139 0,067 -0,101 -0,139
(0.063) (0.084) (0.126) (0.066) (0.222)
MARRIED 0,228 0,284 -0,130 0,245 -0,214
(0.059) (0.079) (0.119) -0,062 (0.212)
MARRF -0,261 -0,298 0,098 -0,259 0,002
(0.085) (0.113) (0.169) (0.089) (0.288)
CLOSE 0,057 0,076 -0,058 0,076 -0,239
(0.044) (0.058) (0.087) (0.046) (0.150)
NOTICE 0,057 0,216 -0,355 0,094 -0,285
(0.064) (0.084) (0.128) -0,067 (0.204)
UNION 0,031 -0,018 0,075 0,010 0,169
(0.073) (0.100) (0.145) (0.078) (0.221)
UR -0,076 -0,077 -0,038 -0,085 0,010




Asymptotic |t|-statistics in parentheses
Notes: The non-UB independent variables are SCHOOLING, years of schooling completed; AGE, age at time of displacement; 
TENURE, years of tenure with former employer; WHITE, dummy variable for white; MALE, dummy variable for male; MARRIED, 
dummy variable for married; MARRF, dummy variable for married female; CLOSE, dummy variable for job loss by reason of plant   
closing; NOTICE, dummy variable for written notice of at least 2 months; UNION, dummy variable for union member at time of job 
loss; UR, state unemployment rate at time of job loss. For unemployment benefit recipients, 'BEFORE' gives the interval before
benefit exhaustion, namely, from week 4 up to week 26/30; 'AT' is the point of benefit exhaustion, namely, week 26 or 30; and 
AFTER' is the post-exhaustion period, namely, week 26/30 onward.



















(0.141)Table 2: The Determinants of Unemployment Duration with a Time-Varying UB Regressor, and Time-Varying Effects for the  
Other Regressors, Piecewise-Constant Hazards Specification
Specification
(1)
<=4 weeks >4 weeks <=26 weeks >26 weeks
Variable
UB
    TIMEX -0,034
(0.004)
    'AT' 1,234
(0.220)
SCHOOLING 0,039 0,032 0,010 0,042 -0,047
(0.009) (0.012) (0.018) (0.009) (0.027)
AGE -0,012 -0,016 0,009 -0,014 0,020
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007)
TENURE -0,013 -0,005 -0,014 -0,012 -0,005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011)
WHITE 0,242 0,252 0,031 0,237 0,197
(0.065) (0.088) (0.128) (0.069) (0.209)
MALE -0,105 -0,298 0,102 -0,104 -0,078
(0.063) (0.113) (0.169) (0.066) (0.220)
MARRIED 0,230 0,285 -0,129 0,252 -0,254
(0.059) (0.079) (0.119) -0,062 (0.212)
MARRF -0,258 -0,298 0,102 -0,264 0,061
(0.085) (0.113) (0.169) (0.089) (0.287)
CLOSE 0,059 -0,078 -0,056 0,078 -0,237
(0.044) (0.058) (0.087) (0.046) (0.150)
NOTICE 0,059 0,216 -0,354 0,096 -0,274
(0.064) (0.084) (0.128) (0.067) (0.204)
UNION 0,037 -0,011 0,081 0,013 0,194
(0.073) (0.100) (0.145) (0.078) (0.220)
UR -0,069 -0,064 -0,045 -0,086 0,023




Asymptotic |t|-statistics in parentheses
Notes: See Notes to Table 1. TIMEX denotes time to exhaustion of benefit in weeks, defined as state maximum benefit entitlement
















Variable Mean STD Mean STD
DURATION 20,382 21,611 7,025 14,208
CENSORED 0,127 0,070
SCHOOLING 13,184 2,308 13,146 2,385
AGE 40,572 10,022 36,826 11,057
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